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A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF MORRISON V NATIONAL
AUSTRALIA BANK
GRANT SWANSON*
INTRODUCTION
In one of the most expensive corporate scandals in history, Jr6me
Kerviel, a French banker, lost his firm, Socidte Gdndrale, nearly seven bil-
lion dollars betting on the U.S. subprime mortgage market.' Nick Leeson's
$1.3 billion trading blunder that sunk his two-hundred year old firm, Bar-
ings Bank, in the 1990s pales in comparison to the amounts of money at
stake in today's financial markets. 2 While Soci6te G6ndrale did not go un-
der like Barings Bank, it did have to issue restated financial statements,
resulting in a significant decline in Socidte G6n6rale stock. 3 Mr. Kerviel
will be sitting in a French prison for the next three years, with a restitution
order to Soci6te Gdndrale in the amount of seven billion dollars. 4 With the
probability of collection from Mr. Kerviel being remote, Soci6te G6n6rale
shareholders are looking for other ways to recover their lost shareholder
value. Accordingly, three American investors brought suit in United States
district court alleging that Soci6te G6ndrale violated the Securities and
Exchange Commission's antifraud rule by making false statements regard-
ing the risk of its subprime mortgage portfolio. Two of these investors pur-
chased their securities on the Euronext Paris, a foreign exchange; the third,
purchased an American Depository Receipt (ADR) on an over-the-counter
market in the United States.
* Grant Swanson, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Juris Doctor Expected May 2012.
1. In re Socidte G6n6rale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495 (RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); see also Nicola Clark, Rogue Trader at Socidte Gindrale Gets 3 Years, NEW
YORK TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/global/06bank.html (noting
that the C4.9 billion loss was approximately $7 billion at the time of the fraud).
2. Business: The Economy, How Leeson broke the bank, BBC NEWS (June 22, 1999),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/375259.stm.
3. In re Socidte G6ndrale, 2010 WL 3910286 at *4.
4. Given Mr. Kerviel's current salary working as a technology consultant, it will take him
177,000 years to pay off his debt. See Margaret Canning, Jerome Kerviel's 177,000 years to clear debt,
and no sick days, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/business-news/jerome-kerviels- 177000-years-to-clear-debt-
and-no-sick-days-14969500.html.
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Aus-
tralia Bank, all three investors could have brought suit in the United States
if they could allege either (1) a substantial amount of the conduct resulting
in the misstatement occurred in the United States (the "conduct" test); (2)
the misstatement resulted in a substantial effect to investors in the United
States (the "effects" test); or (3) an "admixture" of the two tests. 5 Thus, in
the Soci6te G6ndrale litigation, if the plaintiffs could allege that Socidte
G6ndrale's misstatements caused a sufficient detrimental effect to Ameri-
can investors, the suit could proceed in United States courts. Alternatively,
the plaintiffs could have brought an antifraud claim if they could success-
fully allege that Soci6te G6n6rale took some step in the United States in
furtherance of the fraud, including, for example, preparing or disseminating
communications (such as SEC filings) that contained the misstatement.
However, in Morrison, the Supreme Court overturned the conduct and
effects test used by the Second Circuit for nearly forty years. Instead, the
Court adopted a bright-line "transactional" test that essentially requires that
the investor purchased the security on an American exchange or purchased
it otherwise domestically. 6 What does this mean? Foreign investors can no
longer seek refuge in American courts, which have traditionally provided
much greater remedies to private securities litigants than courts in any other
country in the world. At first glance, this result seems intuitive. But this
decision goes much further than only impacting foreign investors, and it
may have an impact on several high-profile caseS7 here in the United
States. Look, for example, at the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico, which caused a massive decline in the value of BP shares.8
Under the Second Circuit's conduct test, investors almost certainly could
have brought suit in the United States because BP has substantial opera-
5. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).
6. Id at 2888.
7. Cases include all the major business headlines from 2009-10: the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill (Complaint at 4, Yuen v. BP P.l..c.., C.A. 2:10-4164 (C.D. Cal. filed June 2, 2010) (later consoli-
dated into a class action, In re: BP P.l.c. Sec. Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (some
plaintiffs purchased shares of BP common stock in London)); the Bernie Madoff ponzi scheme (Anwar
v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (deferring judgment on, but
recognizing that Morrison may preclude the lawsuit against off-shore investment funds that invested in
Madoff)); the Toyota phantom acceleration problems (Complaint at 1, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. CV 10-922 DSF (AJWx), 2010 WL 3940921, at *1 (C.D. Cal. class action complaint filed
Oct. 4, 2010) (plaintiffs purchased Toyota common stock traded in Japan)); and the Socidte G~ndrale $7
billion loss (In re Socidte G6ndrale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *5 (dismissing all plaintiffs' claims who
purchased Soci6te Gndrale foreign stock and U.S. listed American Depository Receipts due to Morri-
son)).
8. Oil Spill Fallout: BP's Stock Plummets Today Over Bankruptcy Speculation, ENERGY BooM
POLICY (June 9, 2010), http://www.energyboom.com/policy/oil-spill-fallout-bp-shares-plummeting-
again-today-bankruptcy-speculation-flies.
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tions here and the allegedly unsafe practices leading to the oil spill and
subsequent financial misstatements occurred here. However, the Morrison
transactional test requires that an investor purchased the stock on an Amer-
ican stock exchange to bring suit in the United States. Thus, American (and
foreign) investors who purchased BP shares directly on the London Stock
Exchange (representing approximately 72% of BP's total equity) will have
no federal securities cause of action in a U.S. court when they previously
would have.9
As this comment will discuss in greater detail, the Morrison bright
line rule is not as clear as Justice Scalia may have intended it to be due to
the increasing complexity and interconnectivity of securities markets today.
For example, American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are essentially foreign
securities held by an American depository bank, which then issues shares
directly to individuals either on an American stock exchange or over-the-
counter.10 Because these securities are traded on an American stock ex-
change, they should pass Morrison's transactional test. However, since
Morrison, the Southern District of New York--considered the Mecca of
federal securities law jurisprudence-recently held in Socidte Gndrale that
ADR investors could not bring their claims in U.S. courts.11 Thus, if the
Southern District of Texas, where the BP litigation is ongoing, follows the
Southern District of New York12, then every U.S. investor in BP ordinary
shares will have to travel to the United Kingdom to bring their securities
law claims.13 It is important to note, however, that several other Southern
District of New York cases have allowed ADR claims to proceed.14
On its face, the Supreme Court's transactional test may seem harsh
towards investors who may have legitimate claims, but the Court had good
reason to reject the conduct and effects test in favor of a bright line rule.
The Second Circuit's conduct and effects test resulted in extremely fact-
intensive analyses and unpredictable outcomes-problems that the transac-
tional test should address to a great degree. In addition to providing greater
certainty for judicial outcomes, the transactional test addresses many stake-
holders' concerns with American courts applying U.S. law to predominate-
9. BP p.l.c., Annual and Transition Report of Foreign Private Issuers (Form 20-F) (Mar. 5, 2010)
(27.74% of BP's total ordinary shares deposited with JPMorgan Chase for ADSs).
10. International Investing, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ininvest.htm (last modified
Aug. 1, 2007).
11. In re Soci6te G6ndrale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6.
12. As will be discussed in Part I, most courts give significant deference to the Southern District
of New York and the Second Circuit's interpretation of federal securities laws.
13. Alternatively, investors could bring state securities law claims-known as "Blue Sky Laws"
or state common law fraud claims.
14. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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ly foreign securities transactions. Many foreign governments felt that the
United States was impinging upon their own state sovereignty and violating
international principles of comity.
Regardless of whether you agree with the Court's transactional test,
one point seems clear: investors in foreign securities will now have to bring
securities fraud claims in the country where the security originates. As Part
III of this comment will discuss, countries have adopted significantly dif-
ferent securities law frameworks, and perhaps more importantly, countries
have significantly different rules for group litigation-if they exist at all-
which is an important mechanism in private securities enforcement to over-
come the collective action problem.
This comment will examine the Supreme Court's analysis in Morrison
and why it overruled four decades of securities fraud jurisprudence by the
Second Circuit. Part I of this comment briefly reviews the jurisprudence on
the extraterritorial application of section 10(b), the antifraud provision of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in the Second Circuit. Part II of this
comment will analyze the Morrison decision, the subsequent decisions in
the district courts applying Morrison, and the congressional response to
partly overturn the decision. Part III of this comment will survey securities
fraud laws in Australia, England, Canada, and China to demonstrate the
difficulty that investors may have bringing private securities claims in for-
eign jurisdictions after Morrison. And finally, Part IV of this comment will
analyze the efficacy of the current securities regime in the United States
relative to other countries.
I. BACKGROUND OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION
10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
the antifraud provision, makes it "unlawful for any person" to commit se-
curities fraud "by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change."' 5 Pursuant to its authority under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange-
(a)...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
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Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Rule
1Ob-5, the regulation containing substantially similar language to Section
10(b) and under which most plaintiffs bring antifraud claims. 16 Because
Rule 1Ob-5 "does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by Section
10(b)," the courts generally analyze the language of Section 10(b) rather
than Rule 1Ob-5.17
Given that the definition of "interstate commerce" includes communi-
cation between any two states and between any foreign country and any
state,18 the statute seems as if it was intended to apply to almost any com-
munication, including foreign ones, so long as that communication ended
in a U.S. state-an argument that the Court takes up in Morrison. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the Act does not contain a clear expression of
extraterritorial application in any section related to antifraud. 19 Despite a
lack of clear intent in the statute, the Second Circuit often inferred an extra-
territorial application based on whether the plaintiff could successfully
allege that "Congress would have wished the precious resources of United
States courts" to be devoted to type of alleged fraud at issue.20 Exacerbat-
ing the difficult task of interpreting congressional intent (particularly con-
gressional intent eighty years ago) is the fact that the private right of action
itself is not even within the language of the statute; the courts have inferred
that as well. So, how then is it possible to discern Congress' intent on the
reach of the private right of action when it did not even include a private
right of action when it wrote the statute?
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. In full, Rule l0b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading . .. in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (citing U.S. v. Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). This comment will focus on Section 10(b) as well.
18. 15 U.S.C. Section§ 78c(a)(17). The full definition provided by the Act is:
The term "interstate commerce" means trade, commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between any State
and any place or ship outside thereof. The term also includes intrastate use of (A) any facility
of a national securities exchange or of a telephone or other interstate means of communica-
tion, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.
19. Note, Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act to give it extraterritorial application for actions
brought by the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice, as discussed infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Berger,
322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Commentators have been writing about the Second Circuit's conduct
and effects tests for as long as the Second Circuit first posited them forty
years ago. 21 Thus, it would be a redundant exercise to analyze these doc-
trines in great detail. Nevertheless, a brief examination of the major cases
responsible for the development of the law is useful before analyzing the
Court's new legal test in Morrison and its impact on securities fraud liti-
gants. The following cases illustrate the development of the Second Cir-
cuit's jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) and
demonstrate the difficulties encountered by courts in applying the conduct
and effects test-often resulting in unpredictable outcomes.
The Second Circuit has been applying Section 10(b) extraterritorially
based on whether the underlying conduct resulting in the alleged fraud
occurred in the U.S. (the "conduct" test) or whether the alleged fraud had a
substantial impact in the U.S. (the "effects" test).22 The Second Circuit first
articulated the effects test in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook when it held that
Section 10(b) reached cases where the conduct alleged to have violated
Section 10(b) occurred outside the U.S. "at least when the transactions
involve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and
are detrimental to the interests of American investors." 23 There, stockhold-
ers brought a derivative suit on behalf of Banff Corporation, a Canadian
company, which had common stock listed and traded on the Toronto Stock
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. 24 Aquitane, another Canadi-
an corporation, acquired control of Banff through a tender offer. 25 Subse-
quently, Banff and Aquitane formed a joint venture to conduct oil
exploration in Canada. 26 In order for Banff to raise capital to cover its share
of the drilling costs, it agreed to sell treasury shares to Aquitane at its cur-
rent market price.27 Stockholders brought suit alleging that Aquitane knew
21. See, e.g,, Hannah L. Buxbaurn, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 16-71 (2007); Kun Young Chang,
Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for Clear and Restrained Scope of Extra-
territorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 89-125 (2004); Roberta S.
Karmel, The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the SECs Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
743, 743-71 (1991).
22. The first case in which the Second Circuit applied Section 10(b) extraterritorially was in 1967.
See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208, rev'd en banc on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968).
23. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
24. Id. at 204.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id at 205.
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that Banff had valuable oil properties but failed to disclose that information
in order to purchase Banff's treasury shares at artificially low prices.28
Despite that the alleged fraud in Schoenbaum occurred in Canada, the
Second Circuit held that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the fraud
had a substantial effect on American investors who purchased their shares
on the American Stock Exchange.29 The court relied on its interpretation of
congressional intent to posit that Congress intended the Exchange Act "to
protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on Amer-
ican exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the ef-
fects of improper foreign transactions in American securities." 30 While
Schoenbaum certainly set the tone for expanding the reach of Section 10(b)
over the next several decades, the Second Circuit clearly limited the availa-
bility of the effects test to plaintiffs who purchased securities in the U.S.31
Accordingly, courts have generally dismissed what are known as "f-cubed"
claims-i.e., claims brought by foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant
over foreign securities-at least based on the effects test, because they
purchased their shares on foreign exchanges. 32
Five years later, in 1972, the Second Circuit articulated the conduct
test in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell.33 Leasco involved
an American company that purchased shares in a British corporation based
on allegedly fraudulent statements made by the British company's control-
ling shareholder while he was in the United States. 34 The British corpora-
tion did not trade any securities in the U.S. 35 Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs could proceed under Section 10(b) because
the underlying fraudulent conduct giving rise to the claim occurred in the
United States. 36 Because the court reasoned that the allegedly fraudulent
conduct occurred in the U.S., it held that jurisdiction was proper because it
would essentially be applying Section 10(b) domestically, rather than extra-
28. Id. It was later discovered that the Canadian venture contained significant amounts of oil, and
subsequently, Banff's share price skyrocketed from $1.35 at the time of the treasury sale to $18 less
than two years later.
29. Id. at 208-09. Note that the Second Circuit always framed the reach of Section 10(b) in terms
of a subject matter jurisdictional issue. In Morrison, however, the Supreme Court noted that the extra-
territorial application of Section 10(b) is actually a merits issue, but the distinction does not affect the
analysis. For the remainder of this Part, to be consistent with the courts' analyses, I will continue to
refer to the issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction.
30. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
31. Buxbaum, supra note 21, at 22.
32. Id.
33. 468 F.2d 1326, 1337 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 1330.
35. Id. at 1332.
36. Id. at 1333-39.
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territorially. 37 And therefore, the conduct test was not inconsistent with the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 38
Based only on these limited holdings, the rationale behind the conduct
test in Leasco was quite similar to the rationale behind the effects test in
Schoenbaum-protecting American investors (whether they purchased
securities at home or abroad).39 But the Second Circuit markedly shifted
from this policy rationale just several years later resulting in a significant
expansion of the reach of Section 10(b). 40 In IT v. Vencap, Ltd., the Se-
cond Circuit upheld jurisdiction based on the conduct test even when virtu-
ally no American investors were affected by the fraud.41 In fact, Vencap
marked the first time that the Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction in an f-
cubed case. 42 In finding jurisdiction, the court provided a greatly expanded
policy rationale than in Schoenbaum and Leasco by stating that the Ex-
change Act should prevent the United States from becoming a safe-haven
for fraudsters. 43
On the same day that the Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction in
Vencap, it limited the conduct test in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. by
holding that "merely preparatory" conduct in the U.S. is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction.44 Bersch involved a Canadian mutual fund that offered
foreign shares outside the U.S. by means of an allegedly misleading pro-
spectus.45 While the court acknowledged that the misleading prospectus
was prepared in the U.S., it ultimately was more concerned that the pro-
spectus was distributed in Canada. 46 The court concluded that the conduct
in the U.S. was merely preparatory and insignificant compared to the
amount of conduct occurring in Canada.47
Then, in Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, the Second Circuit for the first
time combined the two tests because it would better indicate whether the
37. Id. at 1335.
38. Id at 1337. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction,
which posits that a statute is presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., unless
a clear contrary indication appears within the statute. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
247 (1991). For further discussion, see generally William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998).
39. Buxbaum, supra note 21, at 23.
40. Id
41. 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting only 300 out of 150,000 investors were Ameri-
cans).
42. Buxbaum, supra note 21, at 24.
43. Id. (citing Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016).
44. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975).
45. Id at 978-80.
46. Id. at 992.
47. Id. at 987.
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United States was sufficiently involved to justify application of Section
10(b). 48 Presumably, the court combined the two tests because neither the
conduct test nor the effects test would have been sufficient to invoke Sec-
tion 10(b), but using the tests together, the court found jurisdiction.49 Itoba
involved a plaintiff U.S. company which purchased a significant amount of
foreign shares of the defendant foreign company in connection with an
anticipated joint venture. 50 Subsequently, the defendant revealed substan-
tial financial misstatements resulting in significant losses to the value of the
plaintiffs stock.51 The defendant had ADRs traded on the NASDAQ; and
as a result, it issued SEC filings related to these ADRs which contained the
allegedly fraudulent statements. 52 Itoba established the newly formalized
two-part conduct test: (1) the wrongful conduct occurring within the United
States was more than "merely preparatory" to the securities fraud in anoth-
er jurisdiction; and (2) the conduct directly caused the losses.53 Significant-
ly, the court held that a Rule 1Ob-5 action was not barred simply because
the SEC filing containing the allegedly misleading statement was not the
security purchased by the plaintiff.54 In determining that Itoba's conduct
was more than merely preparatory, the court borrowed from the effects test
when it considered the detrimental effect that Itoba's misleading statements
had on thousands of U.S. shareholders.55
Notably, most of the other Circuits have embraced the Second Cir-
cuit's conduct and effects test, although to somewhat varying degrees.
While most districts apply the effects test in substantially the same manner,
a significant difference arises between the Circuits in the degree to which
American-based conduct must be causally related to the securities fraud.56
At one end of the spectrum is the D.C. Circuit, which required that the
domestic conduct itself amount to a securities violation.57 At the other end
is the Third Circuit, which required only "some activity designed to further
a fraudulent scheme." 58 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits adopted similar,
although somewhat stricter positions, requiring that the conduct be "signif-
48. Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d. Cir. 1995).
49. Id. at 124.
50. Id. at 120-21.
51. Id at 121.
52. Id. at 120. ADRs are essentially stocks issued by U.S. depository banks and then usually listed
on a U.S. exchange. ADRs are discussed in greater detail in Part II.
53. Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 123.
55. Id. at 124.
56. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 666 (quoting SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977)).
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icant" with respect to the fraud. 59 Finally, the Fifth Circuit adopted the
Second Circuit's somewhat middle of the road approach requiring that the
conduct be more than "merely preparatory" and a direct cause for the plain-
tiff's loss. 60
Commentators, and the Second Circuit itself, have acknowledged that
the conduct and effects test was an intensive, fact-specific inquiry.61 The
Second Circuit seemed to be intentionally foregoing a predictable legal test
in favor of a test that was more malleable on purpose. That way, courts
could find jurisdiction when they thought it was appropriate to do so and
not find jurisdiction when they believed that the transaction was a little too
foreign. While this presents obvious advantages to investors and govern-
ment seeking to hold fraudsters liable, it results in significantly unpredicta-
ble outcomes for corporations, domestic and abroad, not knowing whether
they could be subject to costly litigation in the United States.
II. SUPREME COURT DECIDES MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA
BANK: THE DISTRICT COURTS REACT AND CONGRESS RESPONDS
A. Morrison v. National Australia Bank
In Morrison the Supreme Court rejected forty years of the Second Cir-
cuit's jurisprudence on the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act when it rejected the conduct and effects test. 62 The Court,
instead, adopted a bright-line transactional test.63 Morrison involved, un-
surprisingly, the subprime mortgage meltdown.64 National Australia Bank
("NAB"), Australia's largest bank, purchased HomeSide Lending
("HomeSide"), an American mortgage servicing company based in Florida,
in 1998.65 From 1998 to 2001, NAB issued annual reports, and its top ex-
ecutives made public statements touting HomeSide's success in both Aus-
tralia and the U.S. 66 However, in July 2001, NAB announced that it was
writing down HomeSide's assets by $450 million.67 Then, in September
59. Id. (citing Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421
(8th Cir. 1979) and Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983)).
60. Id. (citing Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc'n Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1997)).
61. See, e.g., Courtney Haraguchi et al., Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws
and the F-Cubed Plaintiff Problem, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SEMINAR, 21 (2009), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/llm/select-papers-from-the-seminar-in-international-
finance/llm-papers-2008_2009/haraguchi.pdf.
62. See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
63. Id. at 2884-86.
64. Id. at 2875-76.
65. Id at 2875.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2875-76.
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2001, NAB announced that it was writing down HomeSide's assets again-
this time by $1.75 billion.68 NAB explained that HomeSide's September
write-down resulted from mistaken assumptions in its financial models
valuing the mortgage servicing rights, the impairment of goodwill, and
incorrect interest rate assumptions. 69
Two different types of plaintiffs brought suit in Morrison: (1) foreign
investors who purchased NAB shares on the Australian Stock Exchange
("f-cubed" plaintiffs); and (2) Robert Morrison, who purchased shares in
NAB American Depository Receipts ("ADRs") on the New York Stock
Exchange.70 The Southern District of New York dismissed Morrison's
claims because he failed to allege any pecuniary damage, which is an es-
sential element under Rule lOb-5. 71 Despite that the class of plaintiffs with
the best chance of succeeding on the extraterritoriality issue was no longer
in the case, the f-cubed plaintiffs proceeded on with their much more tenu-
ous claims-perplexing some commentators.72 Unfortunately, the dismissal
of Morrison's ADR claim enabled the court to sidestep addressing the issue
of whether over-the-counter ADRs would pass the transactional test.
Beginning with the effects test, the district court easily concluded that
the alleged fraud had very little demonstrable effect on the United States
markets.73 Specifically, the court held that the effects test was not met be-
cause NAB had only a minimal amount of its shares traded in the United
States.74 The court concluded that the effects test was not met because
NAB's ADRs represented only 1.1% of NAB's total market capitaliza-
tion. 75 Logically, it is puzzling why the district courts even analyze the
value of domestic shares when assessing the claims of investors who pur-
chased shares on foreign markets. Presumably, this argument means that if
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
71. Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted). Even though Morrison alleged that the price of NAB
ADRs dropped by over $10 on NAB's announcement of the $1.75 billion write-down, the court held
that he did not sufficiently allege damages because the median price of NAB was $75 over the 90 day
period following the announcement, and he purchased his shares for $74. The court held that a $1
difference was not sufficient damages. Notably, NAB ADRs traded as high as $97 during the class
period; thus, had investors joined in the class action who purchased their shares at a higher price, the
ADR claims could have proceeded. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).
72. Commentators are puzzled by why the plaintiffs' lawyers brought this case to the Supreme
Court instead of waiting for a much more favorable factual situation to do so. See Stephen M. Davidoff,
How Porsche May Outmaneuver a Securities Suit, DEALBOOK (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/how-porsche-may-outmaneuver-a-securities-suit ("You really
had to wonder what {the plaintiffs' lawyers} were thinking.").
73. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 3844465, at *4.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing In re Bayer AG Secur. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
2012] 975
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW [
NAB had a significant amount of shares traded in the United States either
through ADRs or a dual listing, then Section 10(b) would reach NAB's
alleged fraud even when these shares essentially bear no relation to the
cause of action.
Moving to the conduct test, the district court tackled one of the major
difficulties in applying the conducts test-what is the relevant conduct?
The plaintiffs contended that the relevant conduct was the HomeSide fraud
occurring in the United States that resulted in NAB's misstatements in
Australia. NAB, however, argued that the relevant conduct is the dissemi-
nation of the allegedly misleading statements in Australia, which would
mean that the underlying conduct in the U.S. did not "directly cause" the
plaintiffs loss. 76 To be sure, Morrison is not the first time that a district
court struggled applying the conduct test because it had to make the diffi-
cult distinction of whether the relevant conduct was the underlying transac-
tion or whether it was the dissemination of the misleading statements. As a
result, courts have come to inconsistent conclusions, with some holding
that the relevant conduct is the publication of the misleading statements77
and some courts holding that it is the underlying actions behind the mis-
leading statements.78 The district court sided with the former and held that
the relevant conduct was the misleading statements made in Australia, and
therefore, the conduct occurring in the U.S. did not directly cause the for-
eign plaintiffs' losses. 79
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision, agreeing that
Section 10(b) did not reach the defendant's alleged misstatements under the
conduct test.80 In rejecting NAB's argument for a bright-line rule against f-
cubed claims, the court dismissed conflict of law concerns by noting that
"[t]he primary interest of [a foreign state] is in the righting of a wrong done
to an entity created by it. If our anti-fraud laws are stricter than [a foreign
state's], that country will surely not be offended by their application." 81 It
further noted that a bright-line rule against f-cubed claims could create a
safe haven for securities cheaters. 82 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reaf-
76. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank, 2006 WL 3844465, at *5. See Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d
118, 122 (2d. Cir. 1995) (conduct test requires direct causation).
77. See, e.g., Froese v. Staff, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P92,507, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (statements
published abroad directly caused the plaintiffs' losses not underlying activity occurring in the U.S.); In
re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 3844465, at *7-8. (accord.); In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 423
F. Supp. 2d 105, 111-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same).
78. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y 2005).
79. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank, 2006 WL 3844465, at *7-8.
80. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) (the f-cubed plaintiffs
did not argue the effects test on appeal).
81. Id. at 175 (quoting IT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980)).
82. Id.
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firmed the conduct test in addressing these issues. 83 It then concluded that
the relevant conduct that directly caused the foreign plaintiffs' loss was the
dissemination of the allegedly misleading statements in Australia, and
therefore, Section 10(b) did not reach NAB's conduct. 84
It is difficult to reconcile the Second Circuit's different applications of
the conduct test in Berger and Morrison. Both cases involved the domestic
preparation of misleading statements, which were then sent overseas and
disseminated by a related company. Yet, in Berger, the Second Circuit held
that the relevant conduct occurred in the U.S., and in Morrison, it held that
the relevant conduct occurred overseas. It is exactly this sort of unpredicta-
bility in the Second Circuit's jurisprudence which prompted the Supreme
Court to weigh in on the issue.
Justice Scalia, joined by seven Justices, wrote the unanimous opinion
of the Court.85 In doing so, he stuck to his guns-a purely textualist theory
of statutory interpretation and canons of construction,86 both of which
proved to be sufficiently dispositive for the Court to determine the extrater-
ritorial application of Section 10(b). 87 The Court began, as a threshold mat-
ter, to correct the Second Circuit's treatment of the issue as one of subject-
matter jurisdiction, when the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) is actu-
ally a merits issue.88 Noting that this error does not affect the substantive
analysis, the Court next addressed whether Section 10(b) applies extraterri-
torially, concluding that it does not. 89 Finally, the Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' argument that NAB's relevant conduct was domestic, and there-
fore, within reach of section 10(b), regardless of how the Court decided the
first issue.90 Instead, the Court held that the relevant conduct was NAB
making the allegedly misleading statements in Australia, not the underlying
mortgage problems in the U.S.91 Thus, the Court held that NAB's conduct
was not domestic, and Section 10(b) did not reach its conduct.92
Given the extensive history of the Second Circuit's jurisprudence and
other circuits' general acceptance of that jurisprudence, the Morrison deci-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 176-77.
85. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision.
86. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 621 (1990).
87. See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-84 (2010).
88. Id. at 2876-77. The Court noted that asking, "what conduct section 10(b) reaches is to ask
what conduct section 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by con-
trast, 'refers to a tribunal's power to hear a case'." Id. at 2877.
89. Id. at 2883.
90. Id. at 2888.
91. Id. at 2883-84.
92. Id. at 2888.
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sion was somewhat unique in that the Court does not seem to swiftly reject
such widely developed judicial doctrine with such ease. Yet, it did so in
Morrison. Justice Scalia began his analysis noting that a "longstanding
principle of American law" is that legislation applies only within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States, unless that legislation clearly ex-
presses an extraterritorial application.93 Justifying this principle, the Court
cited to precedent noting that it presumes that Congress is "primarily con-
cerned with domestic conditions[,]" and therefore, "legislates with respect
to domestic, not foreign matters." 94 The Court reprimanded the Second
Circuit, which, instead of following the Court's previous decisions an-
nouncing the presumption against extraterritoriality, attempted to discern
Congress' intent through a collection of "complex" and "unpredictable"
tests. 95 Given the fact that the Court believed that the lower courts were flat
wrong, the Court could have stopped there. The additional analysis did not
provide much more support besides noting that the lower courts have con-
ceded that the language of Section 10(b) does not support their position. 96
Most significant of these admissions is when the Second Circuit "confessed
that 'if we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the
legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable
to respond." 97 Such an admission is all the ammunition Scalia needed to
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality.
In disposing of the first issue, the Court looked to whether the Ex-
change Act, and specifically Section 10(b), indicates a clear intent to over-
come the presumption against extraterritoriality. The plaintiffs raised
several issues in support of their argument that the statute does apply
abroad. First, plaintiffs argued that the definition of "interstate commerce"
includes "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . .. between
any foreign country and any State"; which Justice Scalia quickly dismissed
by stating that "[t]he general reference to foreign commerce in the defini-
tion of 'interstate commerce' does not defeat the presumption against extra-
territoriality." 98 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia did not provide a reason why
a reference to foreign commerce does not actually mean the statute relates
to foreign commerce. Justice Scalia generally places great emphasis on the
words of the statute, yet he provides no explanation for why the text of the
statute should be ignored in the case of "interstate commerce."
93. Id at 2877.
94. Id (internal citations omitted).
95. Id at 2878.
96. Id at 2877-81.
97. Id at 2879.
98. Id at 2882 (footnote omitted).
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Second, the Court addressed Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act,
which contains the only explicit mention of the extraterritorial application
of the Act.99 Section 30(b) provides, in relevant part: "The provisions of
[the Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any per-
son insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction
of the United States" unless he does so "to prevent. . . evasion of this
[Act]." 00 At the very least, this language suggests that the Act and the
antifraud provision were intended to apply to at least some transactions
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. 01 The Solicitor General, as an
amicus curiae, argued that this exemption would be meaningless if the Act
did not apply abroad in the first place.102 Scalia was not convinced, and
concluded that this provision is merely intended to extend the reach of the
Act when a person disguises a domestic violation to enable it to escape on a
technicality. 103 Scalia did not elaborate on what constitutes disguising a
domestic violation. Would an offshore investment fund domiciled in the
Virgin Islands but operating predominately out of the U.S. fall under this
exception? Probably not because issuers typically set-up investment funds
offshore for tax advantages, not necessarily to evade application of Section
10(b), even though the Morrison decision provides greater incentives for
issuers to do so.
Next, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that even if Section
10(b) does not apply extraterritorially, it still reaches their claims because
the fraud occurred domestically.104 Consistent with the decisive manner in
which the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' first argument, the Court made
quick work of the plaintiffs' alternative argument. Here, the Court took the
opportunity to adopt a sweeping new legal test that would reach far beyond
the facts in Morrison. Few commentators expected the Court to hold that
Section 10(b) reached the conduct in Morrison with respect to an "f-cubed"
plaintiff. In fact, some were critical of the plaintiffs for proceeding with
such a bad fact scenario.105 The Court noted that the focus of the Exchange
Act "is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon pur-
99. Id. at 2882-83. Note that Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act to include an expression of
extraterritorial application after the time Morrison was decided. At the time of Morrison, however,
Section 30(b) contained the only expression of extraterritorial application.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b).
101. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1998).
102. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14-15, Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719337, at *14-15.
103. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
104. Id. at 2883-88.
105. Steven M. Davidoff, How Porsche May Outmaneuver a Securities Suit, DEALBOOK (Oct. 22,
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/how-porsche-may-outmaneuver-a-securities-
suit/#more-305713.
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chases and sales of securities in the United States."1 06 One reason for this
interpretation is that Section 10(b) does not punish merely any deceptive
conduct; rather, it punishes "deceptive conduct 'in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered."'10 7 And it is the parties to those transac-
tions that the statute seeks to regulate. 0 8
It is overwhelmingly clear that the Court's focus in the opinion is
whether the security is listed on a national exchange or otherwise traded
here. The Court does not attempt to distinguish whatsoever between foreign
parties and American parties so long as they are a party to a transaction of a
stock traded in the U.S. In hindsight, it seems ridiculous that the Second
Circuit has concluded for so many years that U.S. securities laws would
apply to securities traded on foreign exchanges-foreign exchanges which
already have their own regulatory framework put forth by their own juris-
diction. To resolve this problem, the Court put forth its transactional test:
Section 10(b) applies when "the purchase or sale is made in the United
States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange." 09 Interesting-
ly, this is essentially the exact language of Section 10(b).
B. Morrison Immediately Impacts the District Courts
1. "F-squared" and "F-cubed" plaintiffs
While the Court intended the transactional test to be clear, plaintiffs in
the district courts have put forth several arguments attempting to circum-
vent the sweeping nature of the test. For example, the first clause in the
transactional test-whether the "purchase or sale is made in the U.S."-by
its plain language would include f-cubed plaintiffs as long as they had pur-
chased a foreign security from within the United States. In other words, the
transactional test would seem to apply as long as one party was physically
within the U.S. However, based upon other language in the opinion indicat-
ing that the transactional test will rectify U.S. interference with foreign
securities laws, the Court clearly intended for Section 10(b) not to reach
such claims.110 Since Morrison, nearly every plaintiff that purchased for-
eign securities has raised this argument and lost.11 The district courts have
106. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
107. Id (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
108. Id
109. Id at 2886.
110. See id. at 2885-86.
111. See, e.g., In re Soci6te G6ndrale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d
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essentially concluded that this was a drafting error by the Court, and as a
result, have read the transactional test in the context of the overall intent of
the opinion.112 Ironically, Justice Scalia would almost certainly disapprove
of overlooking the plain language of the transactional test and looking to
the intent of the Court's opinion to determine the appropriate legal test.
This new transactional test has put an end to or substantially decreased the
size of litigation for many high profile class actions, potentially leading to
savings in the billions of dollars for some companies. 113 As George Con-
way, the attorney who argued before the Court for NAB, put it: "It's hard
to imagine a case that will have as much direct and immediate impact on
large existing litigations. . . . It wipes out an entire species of class-action
litigation."1 14
2. Investors in ADRs
A question that seems to be somewhat unresolved by Morrison is the
ability of investors in American Depository Receipts to bring claims in the
United States.115 Notably, Robert Morrison, the lead plaintiff in Morrison,
was an American investor in NAB ADRs; however, the district court dis-
missed his claims because he failed to allege damages. 116 Thus, because the
Court was deciding only the f-cubed plaintiffs' claims, eight Justices unan-
imously concluded that Section 10(b) does not reach their claims. Had
Morrison remained in the case, it is almost certain that Justices Stevens and
Breyer, the concurring Justices, would have decided that he was entitled to
bring his suit in the United States because he purchased his ADR on an
American stock exchange. In fact, it is likely that even Justice Scalia and
the majority would have allowed Morrison to proceed in the United States
1345, 1349-50 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx),
2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010).
112. See, e.g., Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26.
113. Greg Stohr, BP, Vivendi Among Companies That May Save Billions From Ruling,
BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/bp-vivendi-among-
companies-that-may-save-billions-after-high-court-ruling.html ("The Morrison decision 'will likely
reduce potential damages by at least 80 percent and may reduce them significantly more,' Vivendi
argued.").
114. Id.
115. A brief primer on ADRs: U.S. depositor banks purchase a large portion of stock from the
foreign issuer and then issue these like stock. Each ADR represents a certain amount of the foreign
issuer's stock. The price of the ADR corresponds to the price of the foreign issuer's stock adjusted for
the ratio of ADRs to foreign stock. Thus, if the price of the foreign issuer's stock drops in its home
jurisdiction, the ADR will drop the same amount. American Depositary Receipts, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm (last modified Jan. 1, 2007).
116. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 n.l (2010). Inexplicably, Morri-
son's name was never dropped from the court docket, which is why his name remained in the case even
though he was no longer a plaintiff when it reached the Supreme Court.
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because he presumably would have passed the transactional test by pur-
chasing ADRs-"securit[ies] listed on a domestic exchange.""l 7
Yet, the district courts have demonstrated already that there is some
confusion regarding investors in ADRs. In Socidte Gindrale, supra, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York curiously dismissed a
plaintiffs claim who bought Societe G6ndrale ADRs in the United States,
even when Soci6te G6ndrale did not even argue that the court should dis-
miss these claims.118 There, the court concluded that Section 10(b) was
inapplicable because "[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a predominately
foreign securities transaction." 1l9 In doing so, the court predominately re-
lied on a pre-Morrison district court case that determined a substantial ef-
fect does not occur in the United States when a company has only a small
percentage of its total equity in ADRs. 120 Thus, the court in Soci6te
Gdn6rale essentially reverted back to the effects test rejected by Morrison
and used the ambiguous language in Morrison to eviscerate the overall
purpose of the opinion.
Morrison held that Section 10(b) covers fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States."'21 The
court in Socidte Ggndrale plainly ignored the second clause of the Morrison
transactional test by failing to address the fact that the plaintiff purchased a
domestic security in the United States. The court relied on an SEC publica-
tion to note that ADRs represent an interest in a foreign security, but it
failed to note that the same SEC publication goes on to say that "[w]hen
you buy and sell ADRs you are trading in the U.S. market."122 The court
also emphasized that the Soci6te G6ndrale ADRs were traded over-the-
counter rather than listed on a national exchange, which means they are
"less formal . . . with lower exposure to U.S.-resident buyers." 23 However,
this inquiry reverts back to whether the fraud had a substantial effect in the
United States rather than the indisputable fact that the plaintiff purchased
an ADR being sold domestically. 24 Based upon the language of the trans-
117. Id. at2886.
118. In re Socidte G6ndrale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2010).
119. Id. (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (internal quotations
omitted)).
120. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
121. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (emphasis added).
122. In re Soci6te Gdndrale Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, at *6; International Investing, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ininvest.htm (last modified Aug. 1, 2007).
123. Inre Socidte G6ndrale Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, at *6.
124. What is even more puzzling about the Socidte Gdndrale decision is that the Southern District
of New York inexplicably departed from its earlier post-Morrison jurisprudence on ADR plaintiffs.
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actional test and the justification for that test given in Morrison, Section
10(b) should reach both exchange-traded ADRs and over-the-counter
ADRs. Regardless of whether Socidte Gindrale correctly followed Morri-
son or not, the case presents an interesting issue post-Morrison: How will
courts deal with ADRs?
Unsponsored ADRs create a particularly difficult problem in the wake
of Morrison. An unsponsored ADR is established by a depository bank
without any participation of the foreign issuer of the underlying security. 125
To further complicate matters, the SEC passed a rule in 2008 that enables
depository banks to issue ADRs without even obtaining consent from the
foreign issuer, resulting in an explosion of the number of unsponsored
ADRs.. 126 The depository bank, not the foreign issuer, must file a registra-
tion statement with the SEC, but it is not required to file periodic financial
data.127 Depository banks may issue unsponsored ADRs, however, for
foreign issuers if they meet the Rule 12g3-2(b) requirements to be exempt
from the application and reporting process with the SEC. 128 Rule 12g3-2(b)
has several conditions, the most important of which is that the foreign issu-
er publishes financial statements in English on its website. 129 In short,
many large foreign companies inadvertently, and perhaps unknowingly,
qualify for this exemption, thereby enabling depository banks to cross-list
them in the U.S. via unsponsored ADRs.
The issue of Section 10(b) liability for companies with unsponsored
ADR programs may seem merely theoretical, as this precise issue has not
yet arisen before the courts. However, the explosion of unsponsored ADRs
occurred only recently, in 2008, and it is likely this issue will arise in the
future as long as the rules governing foreign issuers are left unchanged.
Illustrating the prevalence of unsponsored ADRs in the U.S., the CEO of
Footnote five of the opinion states: "[c]ourts have also held that Section 10(b) is inapplicable to transac-
tions in which a plaintiff purchases ADRs on a U.S. exchange ..... Here, ADRs were purchased 'on the
over-the-counter market."' Id. (citing Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group., No. 08 Civ. 3758, 2010 WL
3069597, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010)). However, contrary to the district court's statement,
Cornwell very clearly dismissed only the plaintiffs who purchased their shares on foreign exchanges,
and it allowed the claims of investors who purchased ADRs on an American exchange to continue.
125. Mark A. Saunders, American Depositary Receipts: An Introduction to US. Capital Markets
for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 48, 54-55 (1993).
126. Ziegler, Ziegler & Associates LLP & Depositary Mgmt. Corp., The U.S. Legal Environment
for Sponsored and Unsponsored ADR Programs, ZIEGLER, ZIEGLER & AsSOCIATES LLP 4 (Apr. 10,
2009)
http://www.zzalaw.com/CM/Custom/White%20PaperUS%2Legal%2Environment%20for/2OADR
s.April%2010%202009.pdf.
127. Saunders, supra note 125, at 55.
128. Ziegler, supra note 126, at 4. Prior to the 2008 rule changes, foreign issuers had to formally
apply to be exempt from reporting requirements. Id.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2011).
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Pink OTC Markets stated that $100 billion of the total trading in "Pink
Sheets" in 2008 was unsponsored ADRs, or two-thirds of the total trading
activity on the "Pink Sheets."' 30 Moreover, a recent study shows that 40%
of cross-listed firms in the U.S. are through unsponsored ADRs.131 How
should the courts handle unsponsored ADRs? Using the Morrison transac-
tional test, these securities almost certainly constitute a "purchase or sale
[of a security] in the U.S."l 32 However, imposing liability on companies
that undertake no affirmative effort to be listed on a U.S. market seems to
be unfair and would impose liability on foreign issuers-precisely the
problem that Morrison attempted to redress.
C. Congress Responds to Morrison
As discussed earlier, the Court in Morrison never attempted to differ-
entiate between private rights of action and actions brought by the SEC or
the U.S. Department of Justice. Thus, presumably, Morrison would equally
apply to the SEC and the United States, and therefore, they would not be
able to bring Section 10(b) enforcement claims either. However, Congress
partly overruled Morrison in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"). Section 929P(b) amended the Ex-
change Act by providing that the district courts have jurisdiction in actions
brought by the SEC or the United States when conduct within the U.S.
"constitutes significant steps in furtherance" of the fraud, "even if the secu-
rities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors;" or (2) conduct outside the U.S. that has a "foreseeable substan-
tial effect within the United States."1 33 Thus, the conduct and effects tests
are not dead. In addition to extending Section 10(b) for actions initiated by
the government, Congress mandated the SEC to study whether private
rights of action should be extended to situations where the conduct or ef-
fects test is satisfied.134
The same day that President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law,
George Conway, the attorney that argued and won Morrison for NAB,
released a memo to his law firm stating that Dodd-Frank did not overturn
Morrison at all and that it should not "extend the substantive reach of the
130. Peter lliev et al., Uninvited U.S. Investors? Economic Consequences of Involuntary Cross-
Listings 19, (May 24, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1533603.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
133. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(2010).
134. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929Y.
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securities laws extraterritorially at all." 35 As discussed in this Part, the
Court in Morrison held that the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) is a
merits question-not a jurisdictional question. Mr. Conway notes that the
provision in Dodd-Frank "unambiguously addresses only the 'jurisdiction'
of the 'district courts of the United States' to hear cases involving extrater-
ritorial elements; its language clearly does not expand the geographic scope
of any substantive regulatory provision." 36 Morrison reiterated the princi-
ple that the territorial scope of a federal statute is a question of substance-
what conduct does the law prohibit?-not whether the court has the power
to hear the case.
III. SURVEY OF FOREIGN SECURITIES LAW
In the wake of the Morrison decision, the district courts have repeat-
edly shut down U.S. courts to foreign and domestic investors who pur-
chased foreign securities. These plaintiffs essentially have one other
option-pursue their claims in the jurisdiction where the securities origi-
nated. It is unclear at this point if plaintiffs will do this. Part of that deter-
mination will likely rest upon the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff would
have to pursue their claims. Each country has its own regulatory framework
governing securities fraud, and perhaps more importantly, each country has
its own rules governing group litigation. While most modern countries with
developed securities markets have some sort of private right of action for
securities fraud, the degree to which such actions actually occur varies
significantly. Each country has its own statutory framework making it a
unique challenge in each jurisdiction. But the more important issues arise
in a jurisdiction's rules governing group litigation. Securities litigation in
itself does not involve group litigation. But very few individual investors
have the financial capability or incentive to bring a securities claim them-
selves. This is known as the collective action problem: absent any sort of
mechanism for group litigation, individuals will not bring securities actions
because the potential reward is generally not worth the costly expense of
litigation. 137 Accordingly, when analyzing a jurisdiction's environment for
private securities litigation, it is important to examine the group litigation
rules within each jurisdiction. Most of the determinants of whether private
135. George T. Conway Ill, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank:
Partly Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged, WACHTELL, LIPTON,
ROSEN & KATZ 1 (July 21, 2010),
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763.10.pdf.
136. Id.
137. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REv. 71, 71-134 (2007).
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securities litigation thrives or not are centered around cost-shifting within
the group litigation rules. The United States, for example, is somewhat
unique in that it requires each side to pay its own litigation costs, instead of
requiring the loser to pay, as is customary in most other jurisdictions.
The remainder of this comment will explore these rules in various ju-
risdictions and determine the practicability of bringing private securities
actions in the wake of Morrison.138 This Part is not intended to provide a
detailed analysis of each country's securities regulations, but merely sum-
marizes the material issues in each jurisdiction that may affect a practition-
er's decision to pursue a securities claim there. In particular, this Part will
attempt to provide a more holistic analysis for each jurisdiction that will
evaluate both the statutory framework and the group litigation mechanisms
together, rather than piecemeal as much of the literature presently does.
A. Australia
A survey of international securities law in the wake of the Morrison
decision should begin with Australia, the country in which the Morrison
plaintiffs will now have to pursue their fraud claims. Australia has an ex-
tensive regulatory framework primarily governed by the Corporations Act
2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act
2001.139 Within this framework, Australia has two main causes of action
that arise in securities class actions. The first of these relates to the contin-
uous disclosure rules, which require issuers to promptly disclose any mate-
rial information affecting the value of their shares.140 Second, the
Corporations Act proscribes misleading or deceptive conduct in connection
with a financial product or service. 141 Ironically, though, the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission, Australia's SEC equivalent, is-
sued public statements shortly after NAB's second write-down praising the
company for promptly disclosing HomeSide's financial position to the
market.
138. Part III of this comment is merely intended to provide a brief comparative analysis for practi-
tioners and academics interested in foreign securities litigation in the wake of the Morrison decision.
For a much more detailed analysis of the group litigation environment in over twenty countries around
the world, see conference reports from The Globalization of Class Actions Conference, STANFORD LAW
SCHOOL, available at http://www.law.stanford.edulcalendar/details/1066; and conference reports from
Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspectives, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW AND
THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA (July 2000), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/joumaltoc?joumal=djcil&toc-djciltoc lln2.htm.
139. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act
2001 (Cth).
140. Corporations Act 2001 §§ 674-78.
141. Corporations Act 2001§ I2DA.
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One of the greatest impediments to commencing a class action lawsuit
is the prohibitively high expense of such lawsuits and the plaintiffs possi-
bility of incurring the loss on the lawsuit.142 In Australia, external funding
for class action lawsuits is particularly important because of two rules, both
of which are different from the United States. First, Australian courts typi-
cally require the losing party to pay court costs. 143 Second, Australia does
not allow attorneys to charge contingency fees. 144 Thus, a class action be-
comes a significant gamble for investors. If they lose, not only are they
stuck paying their own legal fees because contingency arrangements are
unavailable, but they may also be stuck paying for the opposing parties
attorneys' fees if the court decides that the loser pays. This burden stands in
stark contrast to the United States where investors typically have no skin in
the game. In the United States, investors have to pay their own costs only
and attorneys work on a contingency basis, meaning that if the investors
lose, the attorneys will not charge the investors a fee.
In 2006, however, the Australian High Court changed the dynamics of
group litigation in Australia by allowing the use of commercial litigation
funding.145 Commercial litigation funding is a somewhat unique Australian
mechanism. Commercial litigation funding allows an unrelated third party
to fund all or part of the plaintiffs' litigation costs in return for a percentage
of the settlement.146 Since the adoption of litigation funding, securities
class actions in Australia have substantially increased.147 If investors can
persuade a litigation funder of the merits of their case, they can now bring a
lawsuit even when they did not have the financial wherewithal to do so
themselves. Litigation funding arrangements have put Australia on much
more equal footing with the United States.148 Why, then, did NAB bring
their lawsuit in the United States and not Australia? Several key advantages
remain for plaintiffs in the United States.
Like the United States, Australia once had a plaintiff-friendly opt-out
model for class actions, but due to a recent High Court decision, Australia
has a de facto opt-in model. Under an opt-out model, class actions proceed
142. Greg Houston, et al., Trends in Australian Securities Class Actions, NERA ECONOMIC
CONSULTING, 2 (2010), http://www.nera.cominera-files/PUBRecentTrendsAustralia 0510.pdf.
143. Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Defendant-Appellees at 19, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191),
2010 WL 723006, at *19; see also Houston, supra note 142, at 2.
144. Houston, supra note 142, at 2. Contingency fees are fees that are calculated generally as a
percentage of damages.
145. Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v. FostifPty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.).
146. Houston, supra note 142, at 3.
147. Id.
148. Ironically, U.S. based companies are entering the Australian litigation funding business,
evidencing the fact that Australia and U.S. securities class actions are becoming very similar.
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on behalf of all persons within the represented class except those that af-
firmatively provide notice that they wish to opt-out of the lawsuit. 149 Opt-
out models are generally more plaintiff-friendly because they enable plain-
tiffs' lawyers to secure judgments for members of the class who did not
actively participate and, as a result, significantly increase the size of class
action judgments.150 Australia's opt-out model was significantly under-
mined by a recent court decision, however, requiring plaintiffs to define the
class based on who affirmatively signs the funding agreement with the
litigation funder.151 Defining the class based on who signs the funding
agreement, in essence, creates an opt-in model.152
Furthermore, two significant differences arise between the United
States' and Australia's statutory framework proscribing manipulative and
deceptive practices. First, the Corporations Act and the ASIC Act do not
have antifraud provisions per se because those statutes proscribing decep-
tive and manipulative conduct do not require scienter, or intent.153 Austral-
ia merely requires a showing of negligence. Conversely, U.S. courts have
held that Section 10(b) requires a showing of intent to deceive, defraud, or
manipulate; and that showing must be "cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent." 154 Australia's omission of
a scienter requirement improves a plaintiffs chances of successfully bring-
ing a lawsuit in Australia, but a second more critical distinction in the
pleading requirements more than offsets this statutory advantage. Currently
in Australia, each and every plaintiff must demonstrate that they relied on
the defendant's misconduct-a significant procedural hurdle when hun-
dreds or thousands of plaintiffs are participating. 55 In contrast, the U.S.
overcame this hurdle by recognizing a much more efficient manner of
149. Federal Court Act 1976 s 33j (Cth). Conversely, an opt-in model requires that each person of
the class affirmatively elect to join the proceeding.
150. Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Defendant-Appellees at 18, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191),
2010 WL 723006, at *18.
151. Houston, supra note 142, at 9.
152. Id. Litigation funders prefer to define the class narrowly because it prevents free-riders-
members of the class who do not sign the funding agreement but are included in the class due to the
opt-out model-from sharing in the judgment but not agreeing to the pay a percentage of their share of
the judgment to the litigation funder. Accordingly, litigation funders have an incentive to fund only
those actions that define the class by who signs the funding agreement. Id.
153. Michael J. Legg, Shareholder Class Actions in Australia - the Perfect Storm?, 31 UNIv. of
NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 669, 679 (2008), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.aulau/joumals/UNSWLawJlI/2008/37.pdf
154. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007).
155. Legg, supra note 153, at 681 (citing Guglielmin v Trescowthick (No 2) (2005) 220 ALR 515).
In addition, reliance is sometimes referred to as transaction causation in the U.S.
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proving reliance-the "fraud on the market" theory.156 The fraud on the
market theory is premised on the efficient market hypothesis, which posits
that the price of a security will reflect all publicly available information,
including misstatements or omissions. 157 This theory further presumes that
all investors rely on the integrity of the market price when making invest-
ment decisions, meaning that as a matter of law, every shareholder relied
on the misstatement or omission whether they actually did or not.158 Thus,
investors only have to sufficiently plead that the security's price dropped as
a result of the fraud.
Australia has removed many of the obstacles that were preventing
shareholders from initiating group litigation in securities fraud cases. Most
significant of these is the introduction of commercial litigation funding to
shift the cost burden from the investors to third parties with bigger risk
appetites. Yet, the absence of the "fraud on the market" theory in Australi-
an law is a difficult hurdle to overcome for many plaintiffs and will likely
continue to limit the number of collective actions in Australia. However,
plaintiffs are working towards introducing the theory into Australian law
and may be successful soon. 159 At the time of writing this comment, the
Morrison plaintiffs have filed a complaint against NAB in the Supreme
Court of Victoria regarding the HomeSide allegations with a commercial
litigation funder financing the costs. 160
B. United Kingdom
The primary statutory authority governing securities regulation is The
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FMSA"). Prior to 2007, the
U.K. surprisingly did not have a statutory remedy for violations of its con-
tinuous disclosure rules; the FMSA only provided for liability for a mis-
statement or omission in connection with the sale of a prospectus.161 In
2007, the FMSA was amended to include Section 90a, which provides for
156. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,244-47 (1988).
157. Legg, supra note 153, at 682.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 681-83.
160. NAB Class Action, MAURICE BLACKBURN LAWYERS,
http://www.mauriceblackbum.com.au/areas-of-practice/class-actions/current-class-
actions/nabC2%AO-class-action.aspx (last accessed Jan. 16, 2012).
161. Paul Davies QC, Davies Review of Issuer Liability: A Discussion Paper, HER MAJESTY'S
TREASURY, 17-18 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/E/C/davies-discussionpaper_260307.pdf. Investors did have the option of the
common law tort of deceit or negligence but the courts generally found that these remedies were not
available for false disclosures in periodic reports. Id.
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civil liability on an issuer for a material misstatement or omission in con-
nection with any report filed under the continuous disclosure rules. 162 In-
vestors do not need to prove individual reliance on false disclosures in
relation to a prospectus.163 But, for an investor to make a claim related to
violations of the continuous disclosure rules, each investor must individual-
ly prove reliance due to a higher fraud-based standard of liability imposed
to avoid unmeritorious claims.164 Thus, the U.S. fraud on the market theory
is not available in most instances, thereby significantly increasing the diffi-
culty of proceeding with these lawsuits.
The group litigation mechanism in the United Kingdom is primarily
the Group Litigation Order ("GLO"). The GLO is an opt-in mechanism,
thereby decreasing the size of classes and decreasing the potential size of
judgments.165 Further impeding securities class actions, England, of course,
adopts the "English Rule" when it comes to paying court costs, which
means that the loser pays. 166 Moreover, contingency fees are not al-
lowed.167 One trend in the U.K. law that actually may improve the class
action environment is the emergence of third party litigation funding to
facilitate group litigation, although its use is coming under higher scrutiny
and may be regulated soon. 168 If allowed to continue, commercial litigation
funding could have the same effect as it had in Australia.
Surprisingly, even though the U.S. and U.K. are usually considered to
have very similar legal systems, the U.K. has a highly unfavorable envi-
ronment to a private securities class action. In addition to an unfavorable
statutory scheme, group litigation rules are not favorable to plaintiffs. Secu-
rities class actions are almost non-existent. Using an example from recent
news, investors in BP London shares will likely not pursue their claims in
England, while U.S. investors in ADRs will likely reach a settlement worth
hundreds of millions of dollars, at least.169
162. Id. at 24.
163. Id. at 26.
164. Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 17, Morrison v. Nat'1 Austi. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL
723009.
165. Id. at 10.
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Miriam, Third Party Litigation Funding to be Regulated, CONTACT LAW (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://solicitors.contactlaw.co.uk/civil-litigation/third-party-litigation-funding-to-be-regulated-
99810.html.
169. David Greene, The US Ruling on Morrison v NAB Deals a Blow to the International Claims
Culture, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/jun/28/supreme-court-
morrison-national-australia-bank.
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C. Canada
In Canada, like most other jurisdictions around the world, the practical
existence of class actions is a relatively new development.170 Similar to
Australia, class action rules and securities regulation are performed at the
provincial level, thereby creating different regulatory rules depending on
which province the security originates from.171 Beginning in 2005, most
Canadian provinces have drastically amended their securities laws to in-
clude civil liability for violations of continuous disclosure rules-
equivalents to the Section 10(b) private right of action.172 Ontario was the
first to do so when it amended its Securities Act, and most of the other
provinces followed suit in the following years.173 Prior to the provincial
amendments in 2005, most class action securities plaintiffs had to rely on
the common law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, where plaintiffs were
required to individually establish reliance. 174 This onerous requirement
changed, however, and now most Canadian provinces do not require that
the plaintiffs prove reliance whatsoever; there is deemed reliance.175 In this
way, Canada is actually more favorable than the U.S., which has the fraud
on the market rebuttable presumption of reliance, requiring plaintiffs to
establish that the security was trading on an efficient market. 176 Another
distinction from American securities law is that in cases involving certain
"core documents," such as registration statements, prospectuses, and annual
reports, plaintiffs do not have to prove that the responsible party knew of
the misrepresentation, known as scienter in American law. 177 Generally,
plaintiffs in Canada only have to prove scienter in cases involving non-core
documents and oral statements. 178
Despite these favorable statutory provisions in the Canada statutory
law, private securities litigation has not taken off in Canada because most
provinces have implemented rules in regards to group litigation to prevent
170. Mark L. Berenblut & Bradley A. Heys, Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions: 1997-
2008, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, 1 (2009),
http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUBRecentTrendsCanada01.10_final.pdf.
17 1. Id.
172. Steven Leitl & Matt Vernon, Secondary Market Liability of Directors and Officers, MACLEOD
DIXON LLP, I (Feb. 5, 2008),
http://www.macleoddixon.com/documents/SecondaryMarketLiability.pdf. (noting Ontario, Alberta,
Quebec, and British Columbia all have private rights of action for violations of continuous disclosure).
173. Id.
174. Id at 2.
175. A.C. Pritchard & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal and Empir-
ical Analysis of Securities Class Actions in Canada, 47 ALBERTA L. REv. 881, 891 (2010).
176. Id. at 892.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 892-93.
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the types of litigation abuses perceived as occurring in the United States.
For example, most of the Canadian provinces have adopted the English
Rule-adopted by most countries around the world-requiring the loser to
pay the winner's court costs. 179 Contingency fees are allowed, including
the existence of multipliers of attorney fees due to the additional risk the
law firm takes on because it may get stuck bearing the costs of the law-
suit.180 Moreover, most jurisdictions within Canada have adopted opt-out
regimes, promoting participation among passive investors and thereby in-
creasing class sizes and judgments.181
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of Canadian securities law,
and the most detrimental to Canadian investors however, is the liability
damage cap in place in most Canadian provinces since the recent amend-
ments to the securities laws. Damages are capped for each type of defend-
ant: issuers and other non-individuals are capped at the greater of 5% of
market capitalization or $1,000,000; directors and officers are capped at the
greater of $25,000 or 50% of their compensation for the past twelve
months.182 Significantly, however, damage caps are waived if the plaintiff
can prove intentional misconduct or fraud.183
Damage caps, along with the "loser pays" rule, significantly alter the
cost-benefit analysis a plaintiff will undertake prior to commencing a secu-
rities lawsuit. Canada also employs a gate keeping function to prevent friv-
olous lawsuits; a class action may only proceed with "leave to proceed"
from the court.1 84 A court will grant leave only if it determines that (1) the
action is being brought in good faith; and (2) there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the action will be resolved at trial in favor of the plaintiff. 85
D. China
Engaging in a comparative analysis on any modern legal issue these
days should not go without discussing China. While the regulatory envi-
ronment in the People's Republic of China (China) is considerably more
opaque than most other countries, it is nevertheless important to discuss the
179. Id at 890.
180. Id at 886.
181. W.A. Bogart et al., Class Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-Jurisdictional
Society? in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS CONF., OXFORD UNIV. 10 (Dec. 2007), available
at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events media/CanadaNationalReport.pdf
(noting British Columbia is the only province to not have adopted opt out).
182. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.138.1, 6.
183. Id at S. 138.7(2).
184. Pritchard, supra note 175, at 886.
185. Idat 893.
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securities litigation environment in China as its economy continues to out-
pace most developed countries and is beginning to overtake the U.S. as the
global capital markets leader.186 China, like the United States, does have a
piece of comprehensive securities regulation, entitled The Securities Law
of China. Article 63 of the Chinese Securities Law provides that an issuer
will be liable for any losses that any investor incurs as a result of a public
report containing any "falsehood, misleading statement or major omis-
sion." 187 China's statutory securities remedy provides for a private right of
action for misstatements or omissions, much like most modem countries. In
fact, China allows for an inference of reliance-similar to the fraud on the
market theory-eliminating the need to show individual reliance. 88 But, in
practice, it is very difficult for investors to bring private securities actions
for the reasons explained further below.
Structural problems in the broader Chinese legal system present more
challenges to private securities litigants. Chinese courts, considered sub-
stantially less independent and considerably more political than the U.S.
judiciary,189 encounter significant political pressure when resolving group
securities litigation because, for example, the defendant may be a political-
ly connected company or even a state-owned enterprise.190 The local courts
have original jurisdiction over private securities cases, and the local courts
are generally overseen and controlled by the local legislature.191 That same
legislature may represent the majority shareholder in the defendant (in the
case of state-owned enterprises) or at least may have significant connec-
tions with the defendant's shareholders.1 92 On the other side of the lawsuit
186. Amy Wong, China GDP to Grow At Least 9.5 Percent: PBOC Advisor, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/106564/20110129/china-gdp-
davos.htm. China accounted for 76% of global fundraising in Q3 2010. China Dominates Q3 Global IP
Activity, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, http://www.ey.com/BE/en/Newsroom/News-releases/China-dominates-
Q3-global-IPO-activity (last accessed Feb. 28 2011).
187. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [hereinafter PRC Securities Law], art. 63.
(1999), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc-en/laws/rfdm/statelaws/200904/t20090429_102757.htm.
188. Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure about China's
Legal System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 599, 656-57 n. 222 (2003) (citing Supreme People's Court
Rules). Note that the inferred reliance is significantly undercut by the same rules, which provide that no
causation will be found where an investor sells the securities prior to the date of when the false repre-
sentation is exposed. Id.
189. Id. at 647-48.
190. Id. at 646; see also Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, Collective and Representative Actions in
China, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS CONF., STANFORD LAW SCH. 18 (Dec. 2007),
available at
http://www.1aw.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events media/ChinaNationalReport.pdf. Note
that the prevalence of state-owned enterprises in the PRC is likely a reason why the government is
interested in keeping private securities litigation down and instead chooses to regulate itself
191. Hutchens, supra note 188, at 646.
192. Palmer, supra note 190, at 18.
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may be a large number of angry shareholders who may take to the streets in
the face of an adverse judgment. 193 Some Chinese courts have acknowl-
edged that they attempt to avoid resolving such disputes due to their highly
emotional nature-an unreasonable justification in the United States. 194
Moreover, in 2002, the Supreme People's Court of China ("SPC") is-
sued a notice that temporarily banned courts from hearing all private secu-
rities actions in response to a meltdown of a major PRC listed company. 195
The SPC cited lack of judicial resources and inexperience as to why the
courts could no longer hear such cases. 196 After harsh criticism by investors
and academics, the SPC issued a second noticel 97 four months later allow-
ing courts to hear private securities cases involving false disclosures-but
still not cases related to market manipulation and insider trading.198 Re-
markably, this notice remains in effect, and investors still have no private
right of action for insider trading and market manipulation-a significant
departure from U.S. law. 199
A year after the SPC issued the second notice allowing false disclo-
sures securities cases, the SPC issued a third important notice200 containing
a set of rules to govern when and how lower courts should hear such cases.
Most significant of these rules is the requirement that a private securities
lawsuit may proceed only after the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion has found a company liable of the same violations in an administra-
tive proceeding.201 Unquestionably, this diminishes the ability of private
investors to police the capital markets themselves-one of the major ad-
vantages of a private right of action-as governments may not always have
the resources to police every market participant. This rule essentially nulli-
fies the private right of action in China. As a result, it could leave Chinese
193. Id.
194. Id at 18.
195. Id. at 6 n.33 (citing Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zan Buyu Shouli de
Tongzhi [The Notice on Temporarily Not to Accept Securities Related Civil Compensation Cases],
issued by the SPC on September 21, 2001,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030110/905268.html (Chinese)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 6 n.34 (citing Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi
Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [The Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Accept-
ing Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by False Statement on the Securities Market], issued by the SPC
on January 15, 2002).
198. Id. at 6.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 6 n.35 (citing Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi
Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding [Several Provisions on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Caused
by False Statements on the Securities Market], issued by the SPC on December 26, 2002).
201. Hutchens, supra note 188, at 601. Or, as an alternative to administrative liability, in the case of
a director or officer of an issuer, a criminal finding of guilt, see GUO Li & Allan V.Y. Ong, The Fledg-
ling Securities Fraud Litigation in China, 7-8, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 601210.
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investors without any judicial remedy. 202 In addition to the SPC limiting
investor claims by requiring a public enforcement action first, the SPC
notice requires that investors opt-in to the litigation prior to the com-
mencement of the suit.203 Moreover, contingency fees, once allowed, have
been banned for collective actions. 204
One additional structural factor that has compounded the collective ac-
tion problem in China is that a majority of Chinese investors are individual
retail investors compared with the United States comprised of predominate-
ly institutional investors. 205 Predominately individual investors, coupled
with the remaining extremely high percentage of ownership by state-owned
enterprises, results in a very low percentage of investors that have any fi-
nancial incentive to bring a securities fraud claim.
Commentators seem to generally agree that the United States has sig-
nificantly influenced the development of securities law in China.206 Indeed,
China's statutory framework is remarkably similar to the U.S. statutory
framework. Yet, significant obstacles exist that prevent many private secu-
rities claims from going forward. Structural problems such as a weak court
system and few incentives for plaintiffs, as well as procedural rules requir-
ing governmental action prior to private actions make it considerably more
difficult for a private investor to commence a securities suit. Accordingly,
foreign investors should be aware of their lack of remedies before entering
in this relatively new and exciting market.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF MORRISON ON SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS
While the primary purpose of this comment is to provide analysis on
the Morrison opinion and its resulting effect on shareholder claims abroad,
it would be unwise to forego commenting on the efficacy of the United
States class action securities scheme. This is particularly important as Con-
gress has mandated the SEC to study the effect of overruling the Morrison
decision. Morrison undoubtedly closed down a significant amount of secu-
rities litigation in the United States, and because of unfavorable securities
laws in foreign jurisdictions, many shareholders will not be able to bring
these claims in any jurisdiction. Thus, it is important to step back and ana-
lyze whether this is a favorable result from a policy standpoint.
202. Li, supra note 201, at 8.
203. Hutchens, supra note 188, at 643.
204. Palmer, supra note 190, at 17.
205. Hutchens, supra note 188, at 612 (using 2003 data noting that 99.47% of all brokerage ac-
counts have been opened by individual investors-presumably this number is somewhat lower now).
206. Id at 603; Li, supra note 201, at 1.
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It is unquestioned that the United States is beginning to lose its place
as the global leader of capital markets because of the perception of prohibi-
tively high costs of listing here due to expansive regulatory regimes, such
as Sarbanes-Oxley, and more importantly, the potentially high costs of
litigation under the Section 10(b) private right of action.207 The United
States should not engage in a "race to the bottom," however. Rafael La
Porta, a prominent economist, studied the effect of a country's legal envi-
ronment-both rules and enforcement mechanisms-on the development
of capital markets. 208 La Porta concluded quite simply that law matters.209
In other words, the greater investor protections afforded by a legal system,
the more robust its capital market will be.210
The jurisdictions analyzed in Part III rely more heavily on the public
enforcement action rather than the private right of action relied upon in the
United States. The United States could adopt a similar model in order to
reduce some of the perceived abuses in the current heavily relied upon
private action. The fear of litigation arising from the private right of action
in the U.S. is often cited as a foreign company's biggest concern of listing
in the U.S. A public enforcement regime, however, is premised on one
important idea-that the enforcer is independent and can regulate free from
special interest interference. Is the SEC this sort of public enforcer that
could provide the independence needed in a public enforcement regime?
Yale Professor, Jonathan Macey, argues that the SEC is essentially an
obsolete agency fighting to keep itself alive. 211 As a result, the SEC's inter-
est in self-preservation causes it to be susceptible to something known as
"agency capture." 212 Agency capture refers to when agencies become in-
fluenced and controlled by the constituencies that they are supposed to
regulate. Macey argues that this type of behavior by the SEC is not "ran-
dom or opportunistic, but has been a defining characteristic feature of the
SEC."213 With this in mind, the idea that the U.S can rely on a predomi-
nately public enforcement regime could be mistaken. China, for example, is
a model of why the U.S. cannot rely on a predominately public enforce-
207. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Mar-
kets Regulation 5 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterim ReportREV2.pdf.
See also Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York's & the US' Global
Financial Services Leadership 16 (2007), http://www.nyc.gov/htmlI/om/pdf/nyreport final.pdf.
208. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants ofExternal Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
209. Id. at 1149.
210. Id
211. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 948-49 (1994).
212. Id at 922.
213. Id at 948.
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ment regime. Even though China has a private right of action, it is an es-
sentially public enforcement regime because the government must com-
mence an action prior to a private party doing so. China's governmental
institutions have been "captured" by the big corporations, although to a
greater extent than in the U.S. The Chinese legislature seeks to appease big
corporations that make up its constituency. This results in virtually no in-
vestor protection except in the most egregious cases. The SEC encounters
similar difficulties.
Even assuming that the SEC is an entirely independent enforcer, rely-
ing on solely the SEC to protect investors is impractical because of its lack
of resources and funding. Resources at the SEC are scarce, even with the
current regulatory regime relying heavily on the private right of action to
police the markets. Increasing the enforcement load on the SEC would
require significant budgetary increases-an unlikely scenario given the
fiscal state of the U.S. For these reasons, a U.S.-style predominately private
regulatory regime is necessary to promote capital markets in the most effi-
cient manner given the circumstances. Moreover, additional research by
economist La Porta suggests that a private right of action protects investors
far better than public enforcement actions, and securities markets are most
benefited by a strict disclosure regime enforced by private litigants. 214
Analyzing the Morrison decision with these policy considerations in
mind, the Supreme Court likely would have been less inclined to weigh in
on the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b) had the incentives for foreign
plaintiffs to bring securities claims here not been so great. The disparity
between the United States and the rest of the world is significant; foreign
investors had enormous incentives to bring securities claims in the U.S.
knowing that similar claims in their own jurisdiction would likely fail. Not
only did the claims have a greater chance of success here, but the chances
for a quick payday were high because issuers settle quickly in order to
avoid the high costs of extensive U.S.-style discovery. The Court likely
viewed this issue as problematic.
It is easy for critics to contend that overregulation is causing the Unit-
ed States to lose its dominance in the capital markets because a correlation
seems to exist between the two. The U.S. has been slowly adding on layers
of regulation to our capital markets, and the U.S. also has recently begun to
214. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws? (Tuck School of Busi-
ness at Dartmouth, Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003) 22, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=425880.
But see Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Re-
source Based Evidence (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 638, 2009) 34-
36, available at http://www.1aw.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/Roe-638.pdf (advocat-
ing the use of public enforcement actions).
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lose global market share. The United States has always had the most robust
securities regulatory regime, ever since the adoption of the '33 and '34
Acts. It has also thrived as the most dominant capital market for seventy
years. So it is puzzling that critics now argue that overregulation is killing
our capital markets. Over-regulation is not killing the U.S. capital market;
abuse of the regime is killing the markets.
Using other jurisdictions' securities regimes as an analytical tool, it
seems that one small tweak to U.S. class action rules could bring the U.S.
into a better regulatory equilibrium, whereby private litigants adequately
enforce securities violations and the capital markets are perceived as effi-
cient by their corporate constituents: adopting the loser pays rule. The loser
pays rule serves as an important gatekeeping function in most jurisdictions;
it would certainly cut down on the number of "strike suits" in the U.S. At
the same time, private enforcement would continue to flourish in the U.S.
due to its robust statutory securities law and favorable class action litigation
rules to obviate the collective action problem. The loser pays rule would
merely force plaintiffs to put a little more skin in the game-a common
regulatory approach to inherently require entities to restrain their own risk-
taking behavior better. Currently, the U.S. regulatory regime is out of bal-
ance, with very high incentives for plaintiffs to bring lawsuits and very
minimal costs. Adopting the loser pays rule would eliminate excessive
plaintiffs' benefits and raise costs to bring the cost-benefit analysis into
greater equilibrium.
Critics may argue that adopting the loser pays rule would put us in the
same position as other jurisdictions where plaintiffs have very few reme-
dies. However, under a loser pays regime, commercial litigation funding
could be introduced to shift some of the burden on parties with higher risk-
reward appetites.
CONCLUSION
The Morrison decision has unequivocally shut down U.S. courts for
any investor who purchases a security in a foreign market-whether or not
that investor is American. The district courts have not hesitated to read the
Morrison decision as broad as Justice Scalia intended it to be. Some open
issues remain, however. In particular, unsponsored ADRs pose a difficult
question because they will pass the Morrison test, but would result in the
U.S. imposing liability on issuers even when they made no effort to issue
securities in the U.S. The significance of the Morrison decision is that
many of the investors shut out of U.S. courts will not have any equivalent
claim in the issuer's jurisdiction due to less reliance on the private right of
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action and less favorable procedural mechanisms for group litigation. Many
commentators justifiably criticize the American system as enabling plain-
tiffs' lawyers to bring frivolous lawsuits in the hopes of getting a quick
settlement. Most other countries are learning from the American model and
adapting it to suit their own policy goals. The U.S. should not seek to repli-
cate these jurisdictions' models. It may be true that the United States is too
friendly towards plaintiffs, but most other countries do not provide any sort
of protection whatsoever. Remember, though, the SEC is currently study-
ing the potential extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) for private
rights of action, and Morrison may not be the last word. But, for now, BP
and other large corporations stand to save potentially billions from this
decision.

